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Abstract 
This research aims to test the debt policy as a mechanism to reduce agency 
conflict among majority and minority shareholders. This test aims to answer the 
problems to what extend debt can be used as corporate governance mechanism 
in a sense of reducing agency conflict. This research is important since most of 
company ownership structure in Indonesia is categorized concentrated structure, 
where its make a conflict between majority and minority shareholders. The 
populations of the research are companies that go pubHc in the Indonesian 
capital market until the year of 2003. These samples o f this research consist of 
40 companies that are selected based on nonprobability technique with 
purposive sampling method. They were divided into two groups, high 
concentrated ownership structure and low concentrated ownership structure. In 
processes testing the hypothesis, 2 indicators were used, i.e. market indicator 
and accounting indicator. Event study analysis was used for market indicator, 
whereas multiple regression analysis was used for accounting indicator. Based 
on empirical examination result, it is generally concluded that debt policy 
cannot be used as mechanism to reduce agency conflict among majority and 
minority shareholders, both at high and low concentrated ownership structure. 
This is because of average company debt are higher than average industry debt. 
Debt pol icy tend be used as a tool of expropriation to minority shareholders. 
The expropriation is higher at high concentrated ownership structure rather than 
at low concentrated ownership structure and the difference is significant. 
Keywords: corporate governance, expropriation, ownership, debt 
Abstrak 
Tujuan penelitian ini untuk mengukur mekanisme kebijakan hutang guna 
mengurangi konflik agen pemegang saham mayoritas dan minoritas. Penelitian 
ini bertujuan untuk menjawab masalah hutang jangka panjang dalam 
mengurangi konflik keagenan. Kepemil ikan di Indonesia cenderung terpusat, 
hal in i membuat konflik diantara pemegang saham mayoritas dan minoritas 
kemungkinan besar dapat terjadi. Populasi penelitian adalah perusahaan yang go 
public di pasar modal Indonesia sampai tahun 2003. Sampel penelitian adalah 
40 perusahaan, yang dipi l ih dengan teknik non-probabilitas. Sampel kemudian 
dibagi ke dalam dua grup, konsentrasi struktur kemilikan terpusat tinggi dan 
konsentrasi struktur kemilikan terpusat rendah. Dalam menguji hipotesis, 2 
indikator yang digunakan yaitu indikator pasar dan indikator akuntansi. 
Berdasarkan hasil pemeriksaan empirik, disimpulkan kebijakan hutang bisa 
digunakan sebagai mekanisme untuk mengurangi konflik agen antar pemegang 
saham mayoritas dan minoritas," kedua-duanya pada struktur kepemilikan 
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terpusat tinggi dan rendah. H a l ini karena rata-rata hutang perusahaan lebih 
tinggi dari rata-rata hutang industri. Kebijakan hutang digunakan sebagai alat 
pengambilalihan pemegang saham minoritas. Pengambilalihan yang terjadi 
cenderung tinggi pada struktur kepemilikan terpusat tinggi. 
Kata kunci: corporate governance, expropriation, ownership, debt 
1. Research Background 
The main issue of this research is the fact that the ownership structure in 
Indonesia is categorized high concentrated, where the current agency conflict is 
the conflict between majority shareholders with minority shareholders. Agency 
conflict occurs because of asymmetric information and different objective 
among stakeholders in the company. Agency conflict occurs between 
shareholders and managers or between shareholders and creditor (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). But later, agency conflict also occurs between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders, between majority shareholders and 
other stakeholders, like employees and suppliers (Zhuang et al. , 2000; and 
Ariyoto, 2000). This pohcy is effective as corporate governance mechanism, 
when market response this policy positively. It w i l l lead to increase company 
performance (Denis, 2001). 
Debt policy is used as corporate governance mechanism to reduce agency 
conflict (Jensen and Meckl ing, 1976; McConnel and Servaes, 1995; Faccio et 
a l , 2001). The increasing of debt can reduce conflict of tree cash flow and show 
to public that majority shareholders do not use the free cash flow for their own 
sake. The increasing of debt w i l l drive a company to use the cash efficiently, 
because the cash is used to pay debt interest periodically. Debt generates 
external monitoring; consequently, the majority shareholders should conduct the 
best performance to improve the company's performance. This is referred as 
control hypothesis (Faccio et al., 2001; Jensen, 1986; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2005). 
The structure of ownership determines agency conflict type. A t dispersed 
ownership structure, the agency conflict that might occur is the conflict between 
shareholders and managers. Nevertheless, at concentrated ownership structure, 
the agency conflict that might occur is the conflict between majority 
shareholders with minority shareholders. The ownership structure in Indonesia 
is high concentrated. Therefore, the researcher finds it interesting to analyze the 
influence of corporate governance on the company's performance by using debt 
policy analysis on the concentrated ownership structure. The hypothesis of this 
research is whether the debt policies can be used as corporate governance 
mechanism that can influence the company's performance. The objective o f this 
research is to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanism on the 
company's performance by using debt policy analysis. The motivations of this 
research are as follow. First, The fact that the concentrated ownership structure 
in Indonesia leads to the agency conflict between majority shareholders with 
minority shareholders drives the researcher to examine debt policy as corporate 
governance mechanism on the levels of high and low concentrated ownership 
structures. Throughout this analysis, the researcher can understand the 
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appropriate policies for each concentrated ownership structural level. Second, 
the research results concerning the influence of policy of debt to company's 
performance still contradict to one another. 
This research is expected to give the contribution to empirical 
contribution, methodologies, and pohcies. Empirical contribution is to prove the 
debt policy as corporate governance mechanism to reduce agency conflict 
among majority and minority shareholders. The result of the research is 
expected to support the reference books on corporate governance mechanism in 
correlation with the concentrated ownership structure in emerging market and to 
be the resource for the coming research related to corporate governance. 
Methodologies contribution indicates that so far there have been no researches 
examining the policy to reduce agency conflict in the concentrated ownership 
structure using market indicator and accounting indicator. The existing previous 
research examined only one policy using one indicator. Therefore, the result of 
this research is expected to give information to B A P E P A M and stock exchange 
concerning the implementation of corporate governance in Indonesia capital 
market, especially from policy o f debt o f view. B y doing so, it can be of 
advantage as a reference in making or completing corporate governance 
regulation in correlation with minor shareholders rights and ownership structure 
in Indonesian capital market. The result of this research is to give information 
for companies in Indonesian capital market related to the implementation of 
good corporate governance. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Corporate Governance and Debt 
The concept of corporate governance is derived from agency theory. 
Agency theory explains the appearance o f conflict, the essence of conflict, and 
also solution to the conflict. Agency theory (Jensen and of Meckl ing, 1976) 
states that there is a separation between ownership and control in modern 
companies. This separation generates the agency conflict because of its 
asymmetric information from agency and principal. Agency conflict also 
appears in the existence of free cash flow in a company, referred as free cash-
flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). Nevertheless, since the problem of agency 
progressively becomes complex, corporate governance is needed. The definition 
of corporate governance in general is a system, structure, mechanism or policy, 
process and also rules explaining the relations between al l parts in a company, 
so that they are able to carry out the rights and obligations correctly and 
proportionally. There are 2 paradigms of corporate governance; shareholding 
paradigm and stake-holding paradigm (Letza and of Sun, 2002). There are 4 
principles of corporate governance (Gregory and of Simms, 2000), i.e., fairness, 
transparency, accountability, and responsibility. The effectiveness of corporate 
governance is determined by some factors: ownership structure, law and 
enforcement, economy system, social, culture, process, and also clear 
performance measurement. 
Debt policy is used as corporate governance mechanism to reduce agency 
conflict (Jensen and Meckl ing , 1976; McConnel and Servaes, 1995; Faccio et 
al., 2001). The increasing of debt can reduce conflict of free cash flow and show 
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to public that majority shareholders do not use the free cash flow for their own 
sake. The increasing of debt w i l l drive a company to use the cash efficiently, 
because the cash is used to pay debt interest periodically. Debt generates 
external monitoring; consequently, the majority shareholders should conduct the 
best performance. This is referred as control hypothesis (Faccio et al. , 2001; 
Jensen, 1986; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2005). Ownership structure determines agency 
conflict type. A t dispersed ownership structure, the agency conflict that might 
occur is the conflict between shareholders and managers. Nevertheless, at 
concentrated ownership structure, the agency conflict that might occur is a 
conflict between majority shareholders with minority shareholders. 
2.2. Market Indicator Hypothesis Formulation 
Concentrated ownership structure causes agency conflicts between 
majority and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Zhuang et al., 
2000). This agency conflict occurs because of the asymmetric information from 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders. Besides, majority shareholders 
have bigger power to control the managers in decision making, for example, the 
one related to the company's free cash flow. Debt can be used to decrease 
agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders, because debt 
allows public to notice that majority shareholders do not use the free cash flow 
for themselves, but it is used to pay the debt and interest periodically. Debt 
shifts management monitoring from shareholders to creditors (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Faccio et al. , 2001). This monitoring forces the 
management or shareholders to conduct actions, which can give, benefit to the 
company. This is called control hypothesis. Nevertheless, excessive debt w i l l 
decrease the company's performance, because the increase of debt w i l l be 
followed by the increase of debt expense. — 
H i : Market reacts positively to the bond announcement at concentrated 
ownership structure 
Ownership structure determines agency conflict type. A t concentrated 
ownership structure, the agency conflict that might happen is the conflict 
between majority shareholders with minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Zhuang, et al., 2000). Majority shareholders have power to control the 
manager so that decision made on free cash flow is intended for their own 
benefit rather than for minority shareholders. This complies to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997)'s statement saying that when concentrated ownership comes to a 
certain limit, the majority shareholders can fully control the company and they 
tend to make policies that give benefit to themselves. The level of concentrate 
structure influences the level of agency conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders. A t high concentrated ownership structure, agency conflict is 
higher than that at low concentrated ownership structure (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 
2000; Dewenter and Warther, 1998). This means, the higher concentrated 
ownership structure, the higher the power owned by majority shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders. 
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H2: Market react positively greater toward the bond announcement at 
: ' high concentrated ownership structure to low concentrated 
' - r ownership structure 
2.3. Accounting Indicator Hypothesis Formulation 
Ownership structure in a company determines power distribution between 
all parts in a company. Therefore, at concentrated ownership structure, majority 
shareholders have very big power to influence managers in making decision, 
thus the decision made w i l l give benefit only for them but w i l l gain loss for 
minor shareholders. Therefore, the agency conflict that might occur is the 
conflict between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Zhuang et al., 2000). The ownership structure determines agency 
conflict type. A t high concentrated ownership structure, the agency conflict that 
might happen is the conflict between majority shareholders with minority 
shareholders. This conflict occurs due to the fact that the structure of ownership 
is mainly composed o f family or founders' members who have big power in 
controlling managers in decision making. Therefore, the decision made tends to 
give benefit only for themselves on minor shareholders' account. This statement 
is proven by Mit ton (2002) stated that when majority shareholders is entangled 
in management as a director or commisaris, they w i l l have an opportunity or 
bigger incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. 
Debt policy can be used as a corporate governance mechanism to 
decrease agency conflict in a company (Jensen and Meckl ing , 1976; McConnel 
and Servaes, 1995), because debt can decrease the tree cash flow in a company. 
Debt also allows public to notice that majority shareholders do not use the free 
cash flow for themselves; rather it is used to pay the debt and interest 
periodically. Debt shifts management monitoring fi-om shareholders to creditors 
(Jensen and Meckl ing , 1976; Jensen, 1986; Faccio et al. , 2001). This monitoring 
force the management or shareholders conduct actions, which do not 
disadvantage minority shareholders, and consequently, it gives positive 
influence to the company's profitability. This is called control hypothesis 
(Faccio et a l , 2001; Jensen, 1986; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2005). 
V H3: Debt to total asset ratio has positive influences toward the 
profitability o f concentrated ownership structure 
The level of concentrated ownership structure determines the agency 
conflict in a company. The higher the concentrated ownership structure, the 
bigger the agency conflict between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders. This comphes with Shleifer and Vishny (1997)'s statement saying 
that when concentrated ownership comes to a certain limit, the major 
shareholders can control the company and they tend to make policies that give 
benefit to themselves. The higher the concentrated ownership structure, the 
bigger the majority shareholder's power to expropriate minority shareholders. 
Therefore, debt policy at high concentrated ownership structure has bigger 
positive influence than that at low concentrated ownership structure on the 
company's profitability. 
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H4: Debt to total asset ratio on high concentrated ownership structure 
influences greater positively than low concentrated ownership 
structure at the company's profitability 
3. Research Methods 
The population is all companies listed in Indonesian stock market until 
2003. The sample was gained through non-probability technique with purposive 
sampling method; with the following criteria: a) nonfinancial companies listed 
in Indonesian stock market; b) companies whose shares are owned by the 
largest shareholders, with a minimum ownership as high as 20%. This complies 
with B A P E P A M law that defines majority shareholders as those who owns at 
least 20% shares; c) the company announces of obligation. A method o f data 
pooling is also used to give a better analysis result. Based on the above criteria, 
40 samples achieved are then divided into two groups: i.e. a) low concentrated 
ownership structure (low C O S ) , where a company's shares are owned by the 
largest shareholders from 20% to less than 50%; b) high concentrated 
ownership structure (high COS) , where a company's shares are owned by the 
largest shareholders as many as 50% or more. 
3.1. Market Indicator Testing. 
Market performance is measured by abnormal return dan cumulative 
abnormal return (Husnan, 2001; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2000). 
a) Actual return for stock i : 
Rit = (Pt-P.- i) / (P,- i) 
where: 
Rit = stock return period t 
Pit = stock price period 
Pit] = stock price period t-1 
b) Expected return used Single Index Market Mode l ( S I M M ) : 
E (Kit) = tti + Pi Rmit + Cit 
where: 
E (Kit) = expected return for stock i period t 
ttit = stock return that not be effected by return 
pit = coefficient 
Rmit = market return period 
Cit = abnormal return 
c) Abnormal return: 
A R i t = R i t - a i - y ^ R m t 
where: 
Rit = return for stock i period t 
ttit = stock return that not be effected by return market 
pit = coefficient 
Rmit = market return period t 
Cit = abnormal return 
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d) Cumulative average abnormal return: 
k 
C A A R = 2 AAR 
t 
where: 
C A A R = cumulative average abnormal return 
A A R = abnormal return 
K = number o f trading days 
Abnormal return is an excess between actual return with expected return. 
Average abnormal return is observable when event is announced (t = 0). 
Cumulative average abnormal return being tested is the one with t = -2 until t = 
+2 and t = 0 until t = + 5. Abnormal return is measured by using single index 
market model with an estimation period o f 50 days (t = -60) and (t = -11). For 
market indicator, debt is indicated by obligation right issue announcement. 
3.2. Accounting Performance Testing 
Accounting performance is measured by return on equity. Diagnostic 
examine is carried out to test the multikolinieritas and heteroscedasticity. 
Multikolinieritas test is carried out to test whether the independent variables 
have one or more linier relation. To test the multikolinieritas problem, tolerance 
value or variance inflation factors test is conducted. Heteroscedasticity test is 
carried out to detect whether (cr2) variance from dependent variable is 
increasing as a result o f the increase in independent variable. To detect the 
heteroscedasticity test, Glejser testing is conducted (Gujarati, 2003). Based on 
the testing with accounting indicators, independent variables are debt. Debt is 
indicated by leverage = total debt/total assets. Company size is used as control 
variable. 
R O E = ai + PiOwn + p2 Debt + p4 (Own x Debt) + 
where: 
R O A = Return On Assets 
O w n = 1 for high concentrated ownership 
O w n = 0 for low concentrated ownership 
Debt = total debt/total asset , ' 
*Significant at a = 5% 
The data used is secondary data: consist of, annual report from the year 
1996 - 2003, obligation announcement, daily stock price, daily stock price 
index, and other information related with this research. The data are compiled 
from I C M D , J S X Statistics, P R P M , P D B I , Bisnis Indonesia daily, internet, 
stock market data from P P A - U G M , and other sources related to the research. To 
what extent how far the debt policies can be use as corporate governance 
mechanism, the researcher is should test the significance of the values of A A R 
and C A A R on 4 groups, i.e. a) the cash flow increases as the investment 
opportunity set is high; b) the cash flow increases as the investment opportunity 
set is low; c) the cash flow decreases as the investment opportunity set is high; 
d) the cash flow decreases as the investment opportunity set is low. 
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The 4 groupings above explain that in discussing the hypothesis o f free 
cash flow, the starting point is not on how to measure free cash flow, rather on 
how to make a decision on cash flow when faced with investment opportunity 
set. The agency problem of free cash flow occurs when the increasing cash flow 
is faced with low investment opportunity set; this is hypothesis of free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986). The low investment opportunity clearly shows that a company 
does not have a positive net present value. This condition indicated that 
management to use excessive cash for inefficient things that w i l l give 
disadvantages to shareholders. The bigger the free cash flow in a company is, 
the bigger its flexibility owned by a company is. This situation can also lead the 
management to flexibly use the existing cash; where the chances of any interest 
conflict in using the free cash flow is higher as well . It is the reason as to why it 
is important to lessen the free cash flow; for instance, by increasing the payment 
of dividend, debt, and investment. The result w i l l support the research 
hypothesis, i f the median of average abnormal return and cumulative average 
return on the high cash flow with low investment opportunity is positive or 
negative and is statistically significant. 
4. Result and Discussion 
4.1. Result on Market Indicator 
Hypothesis 1 states that market react positively to bond announcement. 
Table 1 indicated that the values of A A R , CAAR2 and CAAR5 are negative and 
statistically significant. This condition indicates that the increase in debt cannot 
be used as corporate governance mechanism in a company. Total debt exceed 
wi l l decrease share price. This result does not support Jensen and Meck l ing 
(1976) and Jensen (1986). Hypothesis 1 is accordingly rejected. 
Table 1. AAR and CAAR Debt 
Policy AAR CAAR2 CAAR5 (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) 
Debt -0.00448 -0.03430 -0.01576 
(-7.90026)* (-7.58850)* (-2.55052)* 
* Significant at « = 5%; AAR = Average Abnormal Return; CAAR2 = Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Retum day 2; CAAR5 = Cumulative Average Abnormal Return DAY 5. 
That negative reaction must be proved later. Table 2 indicated at row 2 
columns 3, CAAR2 and CAAR5 negative and statistically significant. So, cash 
flow increase and investment opportunity set low, agency conflict high and 
bond announcement react negatively by market, this is support to rent extraction 
hypothesis. 
The negative response is possibly due to the relatively big amount o f debt 
exceeding the maximum value. The amount of debt below the maximum value 
can function as a monitoring tool and can also be used to increase a company's 
performance. However, once the amount exceeds the maximum value, the debt 




Table 2. Relationship Cash Flow and Investment Opportunity Debt 
High Low 
Increase AAR = 0.0001 (0.0079) AAR = -0.0092 (-1.5415) 
CAAR2 = -0.0063 (-0.3376) CAAR2--0.0329 (-4.0989)* 
CAAR5 -0.0119(0.5815) CAARs- -0.0239 (-2.6273)* 
Decrease AAR = -0.0004 (-0.0794) A A R - 0.0665 (0.3207) 
CAAR2 = = -0.0371 (-1.0728) CAAR2 = -0.0030 (-0.1522) 
CAARs^ = -0.0231 (-0.7032) CAAR5 = = -0.0149 (-0.7602) 
* Significant at a = 5%; AAR = Average Abnormal Retum; CAAR2 = Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Retum day 2; CAAR5 = Cumulative Average Abnormal Retum day 5; CF = Cash 
Flow; lOS = Investment Opportunity Set. 
Hypothesis 2 states that market react greater positively on high 
concentrated ownership structure to low concentrated ownership structure. 
Table 3. AAR and CAAR Debt High and Low Ownership 





1. High Concentrated -0.0010 -0.0895 -0.0085 
(-7.4480)* (-7.5187)* (-5.4686)* 
Test of Difference 0.0159 -0.0210 -0.0255 
(t value) (2.1830)* (-0.8050) (-0.5830) 
2. Low Concentrated -0.0120 -0.0069 -0.0123 
(-7.6317)* (-1.4900) (-1.7790) 
* Significant at a = 5%; AAR = Average Abnormal Retum indicated market react to obligation 
announcement at 2; CAAR2 = Cumulative Average Abnormal Retum indicated market react to 
obligation announcement at announcement until 2 days after announcement; CAAR5 = 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Retum indicated market react to obligation announcement at 
announcement until 5 days after announcement. 
Table 3 show that the values o f A A R , CAAR2 and CAAR5 at high 
concentrated ownership are negative and statistically significant. The same 
result applies to low concentrated ownership that shows the negative and 
statistically significant value of AAR. This condition indicates that debt policy 
cannot be used as corporate governance mechanism on high and high 
concentrated ownership. 
That negative reaction at high concentrated ownership must be proved 
later. Table 4 indicated at row 2 columns 3, CAAR2 and CAAR5 negative and 
statistically significant. Therefore, cash flow increase and investment 
opportunity set low, agency conflict high and bond announcement react 
negatively by market, this is support to rent extraction hypothesis. 
Negative reaction at low concentrated ownership must be proved later. 
Table 5 indicated at row 2 columns 3, A A R and CAAR5 negative and 
statistically significant. Therefore, cash flow increase and investment 
opportunity set low, agency conflict high and bond announcement react 
negatively by market, this is support to rent extraction hypothesis. 
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Table 4. Relationship Cash Flow and Investment Opportunity Debt at High 
Concentrated Ownership 
C F ^ ^ - ^ High Low 
Increase A A R - - 0.0072 (0.4783) A A R - 0.02115 (-1.6312) 
CAAR2 = = -0.0256 (-0.8135) C A A R 2 - -0.03942 (-2.0015)* 
CAAR5 -0.0069 (0.1643) CAAR5 = = -0.04071 (-3.900)* 
Decrease A A R - ^ 0.0041 (0.6484) A A R - 0.01292 (0.9300) 
CAAR2 --0.0541 (0.9759) CAAR2 =0.00207(0.0719) 
CAAR5 = =-0.0349 (-0.6439) CAAR5 = =-0.00989 (-0.3377) 
* Significant at a = 5%; AAR = Average Abnormal Retum; CAAR2 = Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Retum day 2; CAAR5 = Cumulative Average Abnormal Retum day 5; CF = Cash 
Flow; lOS = Investment Opportunity Set. 
In general, public companies in Indonesia add more debt without adding 
their own asset as guarantee. This condition w i l l burden the debt holders and 
shareholders since this may lead to bankruptcy. Based on the calculation, it 
turns out that the comparative ratio between the debt amount and the asset 
amount increased from 1999 to 2003; i.e. = 0.49216; 0.51162; 0.57432; 
0.51730; and 0.57568. This statement corresponds with Taridi (1999) who 
states that companies in Indonesia have high debt. The capability to expropriate 
increases at the same time as the debt excessively increases (Harris and Raviv, 
1988). 
Table 5. Relationship Cash Flow and Investment Opportunity Debt at Low 
Concentrated Ownership 
C F ^ ^ ^ ^ High Low 
Increase A A R - -0.0071 (-0.9995) A A R - -0.0098 (-2.0987)* 
CAAR2 - 0.0130 (0.6439) CAAR2 --0.0334 (-4.0138)* 
CAAR5 -0.0169(1.6241) CAAR5 --0.0250 (-1.9417) 
Decrease A A R - -0.0075 (-1.2221) A A R - -0.0109 (-0.4653) 
CAAR2 = = -0.0098 (-0.4904) CAAR2 --0.0058 (-0.3434) 
CAAR5 = = -0.0042 (-0.6972) CAAR5 --0.0065 (-0.6872) 
* Significant at a = 5%; AAR = Average Abnormal Retum; CAAR2 = Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Retum day 2; CAAR5 = Cumulative Average Abnormal Retum day 5; CF = Cash 
Flow; lOS - Investment Opportunity Set. 
The result is consistent with Faccio et al. (2003); Taridi (1999), Haris and 
Raviv (1988); Faccio et al. (2001); also with Sarkar and Sarkar (2005) who state 
that any debt on concentrated ownership structure w i l l bring about moral 
hazardous attitudes that endanger negatively on a company's performance. O n 
this kind of concentrated ownership structure, shareholders have the power to 
expropriate minor shareholders; referred as expropriation hypothesis. Faccio et 
al. (2003) state that in developing countries with the characteristics o f 
concentrated ownership like Indonesian, debt cannot fimction as a monitoring 
tool to lessen any agency conflict; rather it w i l l serve as a tool of expropriating 
minor shareholders by major shareholders 
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The reasons as to why expropriating through debt on a concentrated 
ownership structure is possible are: a) the protection on the minor shareholders 
is weak. These are proven by Alba, Claessens, and Djankov (Taridi 1999) who 
state that Indonesia is among countries in East Asia whose protection on the 
minor shareholders is weak; b) Indonesian stock market has not yet so well 
developed that debt cannot yet function as an effective corporate governance 
mechanism; c) the fact that a company's reputation is still dominated by 
majority shareholders indicates that the company still has its intrinsic weakness. 
This is understandable since once the headquarter files a bankruptcy due to 
excessive debt, there will be difficulties as to who should be responsible simply 
because the control system is complicated in a pyramidal structure (Faccio et 
al.,2001). 
4.2. Result on Accounting Indicators 
The result of diagnostic examine shows that regression model has 
multicolinearity problem. Multicolinearity is not a serious problem if the aim of 
analysis is to predict. It is simple due to the fact that the higher the R2, the 
better the prediction will be (Gujarati, 2003). The testing result shows that 
model regression suffer some heteroscedasticity. This problem can be overcome 
by weighted least square. 
Hypothesis 3 states that ratio of debt to total asset has positive influence 
on a company's profitability. The testing result of model regression shows that 
the value of debt coefficient is negative (-77.586) and statistically significant. 
This means that debt cannot be used as corporate governance mechanism in a 
company. This result does not support hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 4 states that ratio of debt to total asset on high concentrated 
ownership structure has bigger impact compare to low concentrated structure 
does on the company's profitability. The regression value of model shows that 
the value of debt coefficient on high concentrated ownership structure is 
negatively smaller than that on low concentrated ownership structure. (-77.586 
< -77.586 + 56.961) and statistically significant. It means that the influence of 
debt on high concentrated ownership structure is negatively smaller than that on 
low concentrated ownership structure on the company's performance. This is 
hypothesis is not supported. 
Debt is proven to have negative impact on a company's performance 
either in low or high concentrated ownership structure. This is due to: a) in 
general, Indonesian companies are funded by debts; moreover, any raise in debt 
is without any increase in asset as a guarantee. This existing condition will only 
make debt holders as well as shareholders pay the price of any possible 
bankruptcy. Based on the calculation, a comparative ratio between the amount 
of debt and asset is relatively increasing starting from the year 1999 until 2003; 
i.e. 0.49216; 0.51162; 0.57432; 0.51730; and 0.57568. This statement 
corresponds to Taridi (1999) who states that companies listed in Indonesian 
stock market have big amount of debt. The capability to expropriate is 
increasing as excessive debt increases at the same time (Harris and Raviv, 
1988). In other words, any debt in certain amount will function as a monitoring 
tool so as to help increase a company's performance. However, once the amount 
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of debt is way beyond a maximum level, the debt will only diminish a 
company's performance; b). concentrated ownership structure impels major 
shareholders to expropriate minor shareholders. This is likely to occur since its 
structure is so pyramidal that minor shareholders will find it difficult to control 
any conducts of major shareholders. Third, Indonesian Stock Market has not yet 
well developed and enforcement towards corporate governance rules is 
relatively low. This will also indicated major shareholders to expropriate the 
minor shareholders. 
4.3. Conclusion 
Base on the result of general empirical test can be concluded that debt 
poHcy cannot effective be used as reducing agency conflict between majority 
and minority shareholder, both on high and low concentrated ownership 
structure. This is because average debt on high and low concentrated ownership 
structure are greater than average debt industry. Greater expropriation is existed 
on high ownership concentrated than low ownership concentrated. 
This research has limitations as follows. First, determining t = 0 correctly 
is a difficult task so that any incorrect t = 0 determination will only weaken the 
research result. Second, concentrated ownership proxy being used in the 
research is the maximum ownership by an individual or institution with 
minimum ownership in different concentrated ownership; for instance by using 
herfmdahl index, institution, family, and so on. By using different proxies, it is 
hoped to clearly reveal the role of ownership structure in corporate governance. 
Third, it is not sufficient to use only secondary data in finding out the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism in increasing a company's 
performance. Thus, the following research should be better to use the primary 
data in order to get better result. 
This research has some implications. For academic purpose, this research 
is beneficial as foundation of conducting further researches, especially for those 
who want to develop corporate governance. It is worth to note that the success 
of corporate governance mechanism depends more on some factors and the 
existence of relations among variables. B A P E P A M and the capital market need 
to evaluate their regulations and to increase the quality of enforcement related to 
corporate governance since there are still a lot to do in implementing corporate 
governance. So far, any practices on corporate governance are just merely acts 
of practicing the law without any concern on how to make it a necessity for the 
sake of the company and the investors. 
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